Prominent protagonists

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Abstract

In this paper, I investigate the influence that the prominence status of a protagonist has on its availability as an anchor for Free Indirect Discourse in narrative texts. I will show that not all protagonists which are prominent enough to be taken up by personal pronouns are available as anchors for Free Indirect Discourse, even if interpreting a sentence or stretch of discourse as expressing the utterances, thoughts or feelings of the respective protagonist is the most plausible option in terms of content. Rather, only protagonists that function as topics with respect to larger text segments or are sentient with respect to the eventuality introduced by the verb of the immediately preceding sentence are licit perspective takers.
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1. Introduction

As a text unfolds, entities of various kinds – individuals, events, states and time intervals – are introduced and information about them is provided – about the properties that they have and about the relations that hold between them (Kamp, 1981; Kamp and Reyle, 1993). It is well known that those entities do not all have the same status: Restricting our attention to individuals for the purposes of this paper, some of them can easily be picked up by personal pronouns, while others are preferably picked up by determiner phrases (henceforth: DPs) with more descriptive content such as definite descriptions or complex demonstratives. Intuitively, this difference is related to the following contrast: In the case of a definite description or complex demonstrative, the descriptive content of the respective noun phrase (henceforth: NP) plays a major role in determining the referent. In the case of personal pronouns, in contrast, gender is the only explicitly provided feature that restricts the range of potential referents. At least in the presence of more than one discourse referent with compatible gender features in the preceding linguistic context, the actual referent of a personal pronoun thus needs to be determined via an additional criterion. As has been argued by many researchers, the prominence status of an individual is that criterion – personal pronouns preferably pick up discourse referents that are maximally prominent, where prominence is usually defined in terms of grammatical subjecthood (see, e.g. Chafe, 1976; Brennan et al., 1987; Crawley and Stevenson, 1990). More recently, however, Schumacher et al. (2016) have argued that at least in German personal pronouns do not really prefer grammatical subjects as antecedents, but rather DPs whose referents have the highest number of agentivity features, where sentience together with control (of the event introduced by the respective verb) and volitionality/intentionality are the features defining agentivity (Dowty, 1991; Primus, 1999, 2006). A competing line of analysis rejects the assumption that the grammatical function or thematic role of a discourse referent has a direct influence on its availability as an antecedent for pronouns and claims instead that pronoun resolution is a by-product of coherence establishment (Hobbs, 1979; Kehler, 2002; Kehler et al., 2008; see Kehler and Rohde, 2013 for an analysis that is aimed at reconciling the two lines of analysis) – a pronoun is always resolved in such a way that the proposition denoted by the

sentence containing it can be linked to the proposition denoted by the preceding sentence via the most plausible among the available coherence relations.

In this paper I investigate the influence that the prominence status of an individual has on its availability as the thinker or speaker to whom sentences that are neither direct quotations nor embedded under a propositional attitude verb such as *say* or *think* can be an ascribed as thoughts or utterances. I will show that not all individuals which are prominent enough to be taken up by personal pronouns are available as such implicit speakers or thinkers, even if interpreting a sentence or stretch of discourse as a thought or utterance of the respective individual is the most plausible option in terms of content. Rather, only individuals that function as topics with respect to larger text segments or are sentient with respect to the eventuality introduced by the verb of the immediately preceding sentence are licit perspective takers in that sense.

Free Indirect Discourse (henceforth: FID) is particular form of speech or thought representation that mainly occurs in narrative texts and that is clearly set apart from the two other forms of speech or thought representation, *Direct Discourse* (henceforth: DD) and *Indirect Discourse* (henceforth: ID), by some formal characteristics (Hamburger, 1968; Harweg, 1972; Stanzel, 1979; Banfield, 1982; Plank, 1986; von Roncador, 1988). This becomes clearest by comparing the behavior of deictic terms – i.e. words whose reference is solely fixed by the context of utterance in oral communication such as *I*, *you*, *here* and *now* (Bühler, 1934; Kaplan, 1989) – in DD, ID and FID. Consider the sentences in (1a–c):

(1) a. Mary smiled. She thought: "Tomorrow I will reveal my true identity at the press conference."
    b. Mary smiled. She thought that on the following day she would reveal her true identity at the press conference.
    c. Mary smiled. Tomorrow she would reveal her true identity at the press conference.

In all three cases, the second sentence expresses the content of a thought of Mary's. This is clearly marked by the presence of the propositional attitude verb *thought* in (1a) and (1b), but not in (1c).[1] Crucially, the sentence following the colon and set in quotation marks in (1a) contains four deictic elements – *tomorrow*, *I*, *my* and the tense marking of *will* – all of which are interpreted with respect to the (fictional) situation introduced by the verb *thought*: *Tomorrow* picks out the day following the day on which Mary has the reported thought, *I* and *my* pick out the author of that thought, Mary, and *will* locates the event of Mary revealing her true identity in the future with respect to the time of the thinking event. The situation introduced by the verb preceding the colon thus provides the context with respect to which all deictic elements contained in the sentence following the colon and set in quotation marks are interpreted, with the subject of the verb preceding the colon replacing the speaker or narrator.

The sentence embedded under the propositional attitude verb *thought* in (1b), in contrast, does not contain any deictic elements – even the past tense marking on the auxiliary verb *would*, which locates the event of Mary revealing her true identity in the past with respect to the narration time, is presumably anaphoric on the past tense marking of the embedding verb *thought*. Rather, the two first person pronouns, *I* and *my*, have been replaced by the female third person pronouns *she* and *her*, respectively, which as such are anaphoric to the most salient female individual in the preceding linguistic context, Mary, and the deictic temporal adverb *tomorrow* has been replaced by the non-deictic one *the following day*, whose reference is fixed via its descriptive content. Crucially, if the deictic elements of (1a) are retained in the embedded clause, as shown in (2), they can only be interpreted with respect to the speaker (in oral communication) or an ego-narrator and the utterance or narration time, but not with respect to the situation introduced by the matrix verb. Consequently, it is completely impossible to interpret *I* and *my* as referring to Mary. Likewise, *tomorrow* can only be interpreted as referring to the day following the day at which Mary has the reported thought if the latter day is identical to the one including the utterance or narration time.

(2) Mary smiled. She thought that I will reveal my true identity at the press conference tomorrow.

Let us finally turn to (1c). The second sentence in (1c) is intuitively understood as expressing the content of a thought that Mary has at the time of the smiling event introduced by the first sentence, although in contrast to (1a) and (1b) this is not

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[1] Note that while DD is canonically marked overtly via the presence of a preceding or following clause with a propositional attitude verb and quotation marks, there are also instances of "Free Direct Discourse" that, while typically involving some form of typographical marking, are neither preceded nor followed by a clause with a propositional attitude verb. As pointed out to me by an anonymous reviewer, there are even cases of unembedded (i.e. syntactically free) ID, which is marked, e.g. by reportative mood or a complementizer. For such instances of DD and ID the question of how the respective speaker or thinker is identified of course arises as well. Given their relative rarity, I have set these cases aside for the purposes of this paper. It might be a fruitful topic for future research, however, to look at them more closely and compare the conditions under which they are licensed tot he conditions under which FID is licensed.

indicated by overt linguistic material. The sentence contains one deictic element, the temporal adverb *tomorrow*, which is interpreted with respect to the inferred situation where Mary has the reported thought, not with respect to the speaker's or narrator's context. At the same time, the two fist person pronouns of (1a) have been replaced by third person female pronouns and the present tense marking on the auxiliary verb has been replaced by past tense, just like in (1b). As shown in (3), retaining all deictic elements of (1a) leads to a different interpretation: The two first person pronouns in (3) can only be interpreted as referring to the speaker or narrator, not to Mary, and the present tense marking on the auxiliary verb *will* locates the event of Mary revealing her true identity in the future with respect to the utterance or narration time, not with respect to the time of Mary smiling (*tomorrow* is then of course also interpreted with respect to the utterance or narration time, in order to arrive at a coherent interpretation).[2]

(3)   Mary smiled. Tomorrow I will reveal my true identity at the press conference.

Summarizing the discussion so far, in both DD and ID deictic elements behave consistently: In DD they are all interpreted with respect to the context of the reported utterance or thought, while in ID they are all interpreted with respect to the speaker's or narrator's context. In FID, in contrast, they behave inconsistently: While some of them – in our case just the temporal adverb *tomorrow* – are interpreted with respect to the inferred situation where the respective protagonist has the thought reported by the sentence, others – in our case first person pronouns and verbal tense – can only be interpreted with respect to the speaker's or narrator's context. As it turns out (see the references above, especially Banfield, 1982 for details), all deictic elements with the exception of first and second person pronouns and verbal tense are interpreted with respect to the protagonist's context in FID. Other linguistic items that are intuitively perspective-dependent and are standardly interpreted from the speaker's and narrator's perspective in ID and from the perspective of the author of the reported thought or utterance in DD, such as evaluative and expressive terms or constructions, predicates of personal taste, epistemic modals and speech act particles, are likewise all interpreted from the respective protagonist's perspective in FID. In the second sentence of (4), for instance, it is Mary who is delighted about her own smartness and who considers all the other people to be amateurs, not the speaker or narrator.

(4)   Mary smiled. How smart she was, so much smarter than all those amateurs!

As already said above, FID has long been a topic of intense research for literary scholars and descriptive linguists. More recently, it has also been widely discussed by cognitive linguists (see Vandelanotte, 2009; Dancygier, 2012 and the references cited therein for an overview) and linguists working in the tradition of truth-conditional semantics have started developing precise formal accounts of FID (Doron, 1991; Schlenker, 2004; Sharvit, 2008; Eckardt, 2014; Maier, 2015). Those formal accounts mainly concentrate on capturing the inconsistent behavior of perspective-dependent linguistic items in FID. There is also some psycholinguistic research on what the linguistic clues are that trigger shifts from the narrator's perspective to a protagonist's perspective in narrative text segments and thus in effect allow readers to identify a given sentence or text segment as an instance of FID (see Kaiser, 2015 and the references cited therein). What has (to the best of my knowledge) not been actively investigated so far, however, are the conditions under which a protagonist is identified as the one to whom a sentence or stretch of discourse in FID mode is ascribed – i.e. how protagonists are identified as speakers or thinkers of the utterances or thoughts whose content is provided by sentences or stretches of discourse in FID mode. I will henceforth call such protagonists *perspectival centers*.

As long as one restricts one's attention to text segments like those in (1c) and (3) with just one protagonist and one sentence preceding the sentence in FID mode, the issue of how protagonists are identified as perspectival centers is not a particularly pressing one – there is just one, hence trivially maximally prominent protagonist available. As soon as longer text segments with at least two protagonists are taken into account as well, the issue is far from trivial, though. A plausible starting hypothesis would be that all protagonists that are available as antecedents for personal pronouns can in principle be perspectival centers as well (as long as it is plausible to ascribe the respective thought or utterance to them). This is not the case, however. Rather, as already said above, I will show that only protagonists which function as discourse topics with respect to larger text segments or are maximally prominent in terms of agentivity features in the immediately preceding sentence are licit perspective takers.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.1 briefly summarizes the main features of the most influential strand of analysis of FID in truth conditional semantics and briefly sketches an alternative account that has been developed within

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the same research tradition. Section 2.2 introduces some new data that neither of the analyses discussed in section 2.1 accounts for without adding further assumptions. Section 2.3 discusses in general terms a pragmatic mechanism that can explain the data from section 2.2 and that can in principle be combined with both strands of analysis. Section 3 is the conclusion.

2. When are protagonists prominent enough to become perspectival centers?

2.1. Existing analyses of Free Indirect Discourse

In this section, I will exclusively deal with the two strands of analysis of FID that have been developed within the research tradition of truth conditional semantics and are thus very explicit and precise in their attempt to capture the interpretative characteristics of FID. The main goal of all analyses discussed in this section is to capture the inconsistent behavior of perspective-dependent (and in particular deictic) expressions discussed in section 1. I will not go into the technical details, but try to give a clear idea of the crucial concepts and mechanisms nevertheless.

The first and far more popular line of analysis takes a broadly Kaplanian (Kaplan, 1989) analysis of context and context-sensitive expressions as its starting point, but adds to this analysis the assumption that narrative texts in contrast to other forms of oral or written discourse can be interpreted with respect to not just one, but two contexts. On Kaplan's view, contexts are tuples consisting of a speaker (who is called the *author* of the context), an addressee, the utterance time, the location of the speaker at the utterance time and the world where the utterance occurs. All (simplex as well as complex) linguistic expressions are now assumed to be interpreted with respect to a context parameter, but this parameter only affects the interpretation of a limited class of expressions, the so-called context-sensitive expressions (of which deictic expressions are a subclass). The first and second person pronouns *I* and *you*, for example, always pick out the author and the addressee of the context in which they are uttered, while *here* picks out the spatial, *now* the temporal and *actually* the world parameter of that context. Demonstratives like *this* and *that* are slightly more complex in that they require a pointing gesture by the author of the context (or some equivalent strategy) to fix their reference.

Glossing over many differences in the concrete technical implementation (and also some more substantial ones) that are irrelevant for our purposes in this paper, Schlenker (2004), Sharvit (2008) and Eckardt (2014) all assume (building on ideas first formulated in Doron, 1991) that in narrative texts not just one, but two contexts are optionally present: The narrator's context C, which corresponds to the speaker's context in oral communication, and the context of some prominent protagonist. This second, formally distinct context c is implicitly introduced by the sentences preceding a sentence or stretch of discourse in FID mode and consists of the protagonist functioning as the author of the context, the temporal and spatial location of that protagonist and the corresponding fictional world as they are determined by the preceding linguistic material. Crucially, for each context-sensitive expression it is lexically specified whether it can only be interpreted with respect to the speaker's or narrator's context C, or has to be interpreted with respect to a protagonist's context c whenever such a context is introduced. Note that there is no optionality involved – one class of context-sensitive expression is always interpreted with respect to C, while the other is interpreted with respect to C in the absence of c, and with respect to c whenever c is present.

The inconsistent behavior of context sensitive expressions in FID can now be captured straightforwardly in this setting: For pronouns and verbal tenses it is lexically specified that they can always only be interpreted with respect to C, while all other context sensitive expressions always have to be interpreted with respect to c whenever c is present. Consequently, *I* can only refer to the speaker in oral communication and to the narrator in a narrative text, *you* to the addressee in oral communication and to the reader (or listener) in narrative texts, and third person pronouns to some sufficiently prominent person that is distinct from both speaker/narrator and addressee/reader/listener and whose sex is compatible with the pronoun's gender features – where, as pointed out by Schlenker (2004), Sharvit (2008) and Maier (2015), it is not the real sex of the respective individual that is relevant, but rather what the protagonist functioning as the perspectival center assumes it to be. Likewise, present tense locates the event or state introduced by the verb it attaches to in a time interval that includes the utterance or narration time, while past tense locates it in a time interval preceding the utterance or narration time. A temporal adverb such as *tomorrow*, in contrast, refers to the day following the day including the utterance time in oral discourse and the narration time in stretches of narrative texts that are not in FID mode.

In stretches of narrative discourse in FID mode, in contrast – i.e. whenever c is introduced –, it refers to the day following the day at which the respective discourse referent (who is the author of c) has the thought(s) (or makes the utterances) whose content is reported. Eckardt (2014) also assumes that whenever c is introduced in addition to C, the proposition denoted by the respective sentence is not added to the set of propositions characterizing the fictional worlds of the story directly. Rather, what is added is the proposition that the agent of c believes the proposition denoted by the sentence, thus accounting for the fact that sentences or stretches of discourse in FID mode represent the beliefs of some

prominent protagonist, not the narrator's beliefs. A text fragment such as (1c), repeated here as (5a), thus receives an interpretation that can (roughly) be paraphrased as in (5b).

(5) a. Mary smiled. Tomorrow she would reveal her true identity at the press conference.
b. There is an event e of Mary smiling that is located in the past with respect to the time of C (= the narration time) and in all worlds that are compatible with the beliefs of the author of c (= Mary) at the time of c (= the time of e) there is an event e' of Mary revealing her true identity at the press conference that is located in the past with respect to the time of C (= the narration time) and in the future with respect to the time of e and that takes place on the day that follows the day including the time of c (= the time of e).

As can be seen in (5b), a second context c is implicitly introduced by the first sentence, with all parameters of c determined by that sentence, and in the second sentence the adverb *tomorrow* is interpreted with respect to (the temporal parameter of) c, while both the third person female pronoun (which is resolved to the most prominent female individual available, namely Mary) and verbal tense are interpreted with respect to the narrator's context C. In addition to that, the entire proposition denoted by the second sentence is turned into a belief that the author of c, Mary, has at the time of c, which is the time of her smiling.

The analysis just sketched can easily be extended to perspective-dependent expressions and constructions such as evaluative nouns or adjectives, exclamatives and epistemic modals all of which have in common that they in oral communication and most texts types are (at least standardly; see Harris and Potts, 2009; Kaiser, 2015 for discussion) interpreted from the speaker's or author's perspective, while in narrative texts they can either be interpreted from the narrator's perspective or, in sentences or text fragments in FID mode, from some prominent protagonist's perspective. In order to capture this behavior, one only needs to assume that all of these expressions and constructions contain a judge parameter (Lasersohn, 2005; Stephenson, 2007) that is set to the author of C by default in the absence of c and to the author of c whenever c is present. A text fragment such as (4), repeated here as (6a), thus receives an interpretation that can (very roughly) be paraphrased as in (6b).

(6) a. Mary smiled. How smart she was, so much smarter than all those amateurs!
b. There is an event e of Mary smiling that is located in the past with respect to C (= the narration time) and there is an event e' of the author of c (= Mary) being delighted by the high degree of her own smartness which is located at the time of e, where the author of c (= Mary) believes her smartness to surpass the smartness of all members of some prominent group of people, and where the author of c (= Mary) considers all of those people to be amateurs.

Maier (2015) argues for a fundamentally different approach to FID. In his view, FID is a special, highly conventionalized form of *mixed quotation* – it consists of quotations of thoughts or utterances that contain unquoted parts, namely pronouns and tense markings, where the quoted parts are not set apart from the unquoted ones typographically (via quotation marks or in some other way). The text fragment in (1c)/(5a), for instance, would then correspond to the schematic representation in (7a), with the second sentence being a partial quotation of a thought that Mary has at the time introduced by the first sentence. In (7b) the fully quoted, explicitly introduced version of the same thought that was already given in (1a) is repeated for comparison.

(7) a. Mary smiled. ''Tomorrow'' she ''will''-ed ''reveal'' her ''true identity at the press conference''.
b. Mary smiled. She thought: ''Tomorrow I will reveal my true identity at the press conference''.

Note that although the mechanisms by which they come about are very different, the resulting interpretations are quite similar on the two strands of analysis as far as the interpretation of perspective-dependent expressions and constructions is concerned[3]: In both cases all perspective-dependent expressions with the exception of pronouns and tenses end up being interpreted with respect to the context of some prominent protagonist, while pronouns and tenses are interpreted with respect to the narrator's context. In addition to that, both strands of analysis leave open the following two fundamental questions: First, why do pronouns and tenses differ from all the other perspective-dependent expressions (but see Schlenker, 2004 for some interesting speculations)? On the first strand of analysis, it is a matter of lexical conventions, while on Maier's account it is a matter of literary conventions. Neither assumption achieves more than a restatement of the

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[3] There is a crucial difference insofar as Maier (2015) can handle an aspect of FID quite easily that is not captured by the analyses which assume the presence of two contexts: the fact that FID often contains expressions that are characteristic for a particular protagonist's way of speaking (even including misspellings and other mistakes).

observed distribution. Second, how are the authors of the implicitly introduced contexts/partially quoted accommodated thoughts or utterances identified?

While I do not have anything to say in this paper concerning the first question, I will be concerned with the second one in the remainder of the paper.

2.2. The data to be accounted for

As already said in the introduction, the text segments that are usually discussed in linguistic analyses of FID – and also the ones that were considered in this paper so far – consist of just two or three sentences with only one protagonist. The question of what the conditions are under which protagonists become available as perspectival centers for obvious reasons does not really arise with respect to this kind of data – as long as it is plausible in terms of content, the sentence or stretch of discourse in FID mode is automatically interpreted as a thought or utterance of the only and hence maximally prominent protagonist available. A plausible starting hypothesis concerning the general mechanism by which protagonists are identified as perspectival centers would be to assume that each protagonist who is prominent enough to serve as an antecedent for a personal pronoun is available as a perspectival center as well. With this in mind, consider the text segments in (8), both of which consist of an introductory sentence making available two protagonists followed by a sentence in FID mode:

(8) a. Susan looked at George hatefully. The dumb jerk had managed to make her look like an idiot at the meeting
        yesterday.
     b. Susan looked at George hatefully. #The mean old hag had managed to make him look like an idiot at the meeting
        yesterday.

The epithet in (8a) can only refer to male individuals, and the one in (8b) to female ones, and since neither George nor Susan can refer to themselves via epithets, the epithet in (8a) can only be understood as expressing a negative evaluation of George by Susan, and the one in (8b) as expressing a negative evaluation of Susan by George. In terms of content, both taking the second sentence in (8a) as a thought of Susan and the one in (8b) as a thought of George makes sense – in (8a), the content of the thought gives a reason for why Susan looks at George hatefully, while in (8b) it further specifies Susan's negative attitude toward George which can be inferred from her looking at him hatefully. Although both continuations are thus in principle plausible, the one in (8a) is entirely natural, while the one in (8b) sounds weird (as indicated by the fronted hash mark) – it is quite difficult to arrive at a coherent interpretation of (8b). As shown by (9a-b), however, the opening sentence in (8a) and (8b) makes both Susan and George prominent enough to serve as the antecedents of a personal pronoun.

(9) a. Susan looked at George hatefully. She quickly turned away when he returned the look.
     b. Susan looked at George hatefully. He returned the look, then turned his back on her and walked away.

Still, the opening sentence in (8a-b) and (9a-b) certainly does not lend equal prominence to Susan and George – the proper name *Susan* is more prominent than *George* in terms of at least two independently established prominence scales: First, *Susan* is the grammatical subject of the sentence, while *George* is a prepositional object. It is often assumed that personal pronouns have a preference for picking up antecedents referred to by subject DPs because personal pronouns prefer the most prominent antecedents and subjects are the most prominent DPs within their clauses (see, e.g. Chafe, 1976; Brennan et al., 1987; Crawley and Stevenson, 1990).

Second, Susan is the experiencer of the event introduced by the verb, while George is the theme. Now, Dowty (1991) assumes agentivity to be a cluster concept being decomposable into the following basic features (see Primus, 1999, 2006 for additional discussion and refinements): control (of the event denoted by the respective verb), volitionality/intentionality and sentience. On that view, Susan, in virtue of being the experiencer, has at least one agentivity feature – namely sentience – in (8a-b) and (9a-b), while George, in virtue of being the theme, has none. Schumacher et al. (2016) argue that at least in German personal pronouns prefer individuals with the highest number of agentivity features as their antecedents. Susan is thus clearly more prominent than George with respect to both grammatical function (of the DP referring to her) and thematic role.

Let us finally turn to the question of what the coherence-based account (Hobbs, 1979; Kehler, 2002; Kehler et al., 2008) has to say about the contrast between (8a) and (8b). On that account, the crucial question is not how prominent the respective discourse referent is made by the first sentence, but rather what the most plausible coherence relation is that links the proposition denoted by the second sentence to the one denoted by the first sentence. As already said above, in the case of (8a), if the second sentence is interpreted as a thought of Susan, that thought can plausibly be understood as providing an explanation for the proposition denoted by the first sentence – the fact that Susan thinks that George has managed to make her look like an idiot at the meeting on the previous day explains why she looks at him hatefully.

Consequently, the two sentences in (8a) can plausibly be conceived of as being linked via the explanation-relation. As discussed in detail by Kehler (2002) and Kehler et al. (2008), there is a strong tendency to interpret sentences following ones that contain a verb specifying the negative or positive attitude of an individual toward another individual as providing an explanation for that attitude.

Concerning (8b), in contrast, interpreting the second sentence as a thought of George does not allow it to be linked to the first one via a similarly salient coherence relation. Rather, it has to be inferred that George upon noticing Susan's hateful look at him thinks of another recent event that provides further evidence for her negative attitude toward him. While it is not inherently implausible to attribute such a thought to George in the context provided by the first sentence, the link between the two sentences is still far less direct and salient in the case of (8b) than it is in the case of (8a). That contrast might be responsible for the infelicity of the text segment in (8b) as compared to (8a). Note, however, that the variant in (10), where George's thought is given in DD-mode in the second sentence, is not as infelicitous as (8b), and there is no problem in resolving the personal pronoun to George, although the link between the two sentences is essentially the same. The only difference between the two text segments is that in the case of (8b) the reader has to infer that the second sentence is a thought of George, while in the case of (10) it is directly stated.

(10) Susan looked at George hatefully. He thought: ''The mean old hag has made me look like an idiot at the meeting yesterday''.

Summing up our discussion so far, all three analyses of the mechanisms underlying pronoun resolution that we have considered predict (8a) to be at least more natural than (8b): The two prominence-based accounts predict this because the discourse referent to whom the second sentence has to be ascribed as a thought in order for the resulting interpretation to be coherent is more prominent in terms of both grammatical function and thematic role/agentivity features in the case of (8a) than in the case of (8b). The coherence-based account makes the same prediction because in the case of (8a) there is a highly prominent coherence relation – namely explanation – available to link the two sentences, while in the case of (8b) the two sentences have to be linked more indirectly. Still, the felicity of the variants in (9b) and (10) shows that pronoun resolution is still possible in the case predicted to be dispreferred by the respective account for the same reason for which (8b) is predicted to be dispreferred. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that what is just a preference that can rather easily be overwritten in the case of pronoun resolution if there is only one potential antecedent available (as in (9b) and (10)) is a stricter constraint in the process of determining perspectival centers. But now consider the text segments in (11a-b):

(11) a. George entered the room and looked around cautiously. Susan was sitting at a table in the corner with her best friend. Susan looked at George hatefully. The dumb jerk had managed to make her look like an idiot at the meeting yesterday.
b. George entered the room and looked around cautiously. Susan was sitting at a table in the corner with her best friend. Susan looked at George hatefully. The mean old hag had managed to make him look like an idiot at the meeting yesterday.

With the additional context provided by the two opening sentences, not only Susan, but also George becomes available as a perspectival center: The final sentence in FID mode that sounded weird in (8b) is a lot more natural in (11b), although the immediately preceding sentence is the same in both cases. At the same time, Susan remains available as a perspectival center, since the final sentence in FID mode in (8a) continues to be completely natural in (11a) (in fact, it might still be slightly better than (11b)). Intuitively, what seems to have happened in (11a-b) is that George becomes available as a perspectival center in addition to Susan in virtue of having been made globally prominent with respect to the entire text segment by the two opening sentences. This is predicted neither by the accounts based on local prominence in terms of grammatical function or thematic role/agentivity features nor by the coherence based account, since the coherence relation linking the sentence in FID mode to the preceding sentence remains the same. With this in mind, consider next the two continuations of the text segment in (12) in (12a) and (12b):

(12) Mary went toward the entrance of the building. Suddenly a huge guy in a black coat came around the corner. He bumped into her head-on. Angrily, she smacked him in the face with her bag.
a. #Ouch, how that hurt!
b. That would teach the dumb jerk to watch out!

The exclamative in (12a) can only sensibly be ascribed to the man introduced by the indefinite in the second sentence, not to Mary, since hitting someone with a bag (at least under normal circumstances) causes pain in the hittee, not the hitter. In spite of being plausible in terms of content, (12a) sounds weird in the context of (12), i.e. the man hit by Mary does not

seem to be readily available as a perspectival center. Given the discussion in this section so far, this is directly predicted by the two accounts based on local prominence, since Mary is locally clearly more prominent than the man both in terms of grammatical function and thematic role/agentivity features: The proper name referring to her is the subject of the immediately preceding sentence, and she is the agent of the event introduced by the verb, while the man is the patient. The coherence-based account, in contrast, does not predict (12a) to be less felicitous than (12b): The sentence in (12a), if it is interpreted as (the content of) a thought by the man, can be linked to the preceding sentence via the cause-effect relation, i.e. it is the event of Mary hitting him with her bag that causes the man to feel pain and have the corresponding thought. The sentence in (12b), in contrast, if it is interpreted as (the content of) a thought of Mary, can be linked to the preceding sentence via the explanation relation, i.e. it gives the reason for Mary's hitting the man with her bag. Now, it is not at all obvious why the link provided by the explanation relation should be better than the one provided by the cause-effect relation. That there is nothing inherently problematic about linking a sentence following the final sentence in (12a) to that sentence via the cause-effect relation is furthermore shown by the felicity of the variant in (13).

(13)   Mary went towards the entrance of the building. Suddenly a huge guy in a black coat came around the corner. He bumped into her head-on. Angrily, she smacked him in the face with her bag. He felt a sharp pain in his left cheek.

The three accounts thus diverge with respect to the predictions they make about the felicity of (12a) and (12b): While the two accounts based on local coherence predict (12a) to be infelicitous and (12b) to be felicitous, the coherence-based account predicts both to be felicitous. Finally, note that it is intuitively plausible that Mary is not only locally, but also globally more prominent than the man with respect to the entire text segment in virtue of being mentioned in the opening sentence, just like George was globally more prominent than Susan in (11). Since global and local prominence are aligned in (12) in contrast to (11), there is no alternative option for the locally less prominent discourse referent to become available as perspectival center. Consider next the two continuations of the text segment in (14) in (14a) and (14b).

(14)   Mary went towards the entrance of the building. Suddenly a huge guy in a black coat came around the corner. She bumped into him head-on. Angrily, he smacked her in the face with his bag.
       a. Ouch, how that hurt!
       b. That would teach the old hag to watch out!

Given the context in (14), the exclamative in (14a) can only sensibly be ascribed to Mary. Crucially, it sounds entirely natural and coherent, in spite of the fact that Mary is locally no more prominent at the point at which (14a) is added to the text than the man in (12) was at the point at which (12a) was added – the pronoun referring to her is the object of the immediately preceding sentence, and she is the theme of the event introduced by the verb of that sentence. Likewise, the coherence relation linking (14a) to its preceding sentence is the same as the one linking (12a) to its preceding sentence. Consequently, it seems to be Mary's global prominence with respect to the entire text segment that makes the difference and licenses her as a perspectival center. At the same time, the continuation in (14b), which can only sensibly be ascribed to the man introduced by the indefinite in the second sentence, likewise sounds quite natural and coherent in the context of (14). This is again predicted by all three accounts: First, the man is locally prominent with respect to both grammatical function and thematic role/agentivity features – the pronoun referring to him is the subject of the immediately preceding sentence and he is the agent of the event introduced by the verb of that sentence. Second, the sentence in (14b) can be linked to the sentence preceding it via the explanation relation, entirely parallel to the case of (12b).

In this section, we have taken a close look at the conditions that license discourse referents as perspectival centers with respect to sentences in FID mode. We started with the hypothesis that the same mechanisms that make discourse referents available as antecedents for pronouns also make them available as perspectival centers. This hypothesis turned out to be false – in some cases discourse referents that could be picked up by pronouns were not available as perspectival centers, although it would in principle have made sense to interpret the sentence in FID mode as (the content of) a thought of the respective discourse referent. Nevertheless, with respect to the first case (the text segment in (8b)) the three accounts of the mechanisms underlying pronoun resolution that we considered at least predicted the discourse referent that was unavailable as perspectival center to be dispreferred. First, because it was locally less prominent than another contextually given discourse referent in terms of grammatical function and thematic role/agentivity features. Second, because the sentence in FID mode could only be linked to the preceding sentence containing the respective discourse referent in a rather indirect way. The felicity of the text segment in (11b) has shown, however, that global prominence can override the lack of local prominence in terms of grammatical function and thematic role/agentivity features and the absence of a direct, prominent local coherence relation.

The importance of global prominence as a licensing factor was further confirmed by the felicity of (14a) in the context of (14), as opposed to the infelicity of (12a) in the context of (12). Finally, the contrast between (12a) and (12b) has shown

that the availability of a prominent, direct local coherence relation is not enough to license a discourse referent as perspectival center if it is neither locally nor globally prominent. It thus seems that only those discourse referents are available as perspectival centers that meet one of the two following conditions: They are either maximally prominent in terms of grammatical function and thematic role/agentivity features in the sentence immediately preceding the one in FID mode or they are globally prominent with respect to the entire text segment containing that sentence.

2.3. A pragmatic strategy for identifying perspectival centers

In this section, I will sketch in very general terms a pragmatic strategy for identifying perspectival centers that captures the data discussed in section 2.2 and that can in principle be combined with both types of accounts of FID that were discussed in section 2.1. Clearly, much more empirical work is required in order to reach more definitive conclusions on the basis of which a fully worked out analysis can be developed, but I hope that the data discussed in section 2.2 and the outline of how they can be accounted for provide a useful starting point.

As we have seen, in order to be available as a perspectival center, a protagonist either needs to be locally maximally prominent in terms of grammatical function and thematic role/agentivity features or globally prominent – the availability of a salient coherence relation linking the (content of the) sentence in FID to the (content of the) sentence preceding it is not enough, and global prominence can even override the absence of a highly salient, direct coherence relation linking the sentence in FID-mode to the one preceding it (although the two sentences ultimately need to be linked by an inferable coherence relation, of course). Let us begin by having a closer look at the two kinds of prominence in turn. So far, I have characterized local prominence in terms of two prominence related scales: grammatical function and thematic role. With respect to the first scale DPs functioning as grammatical subjects are usually assumed to be maximally prominent, followed by ones functioning as indirect objects (see, e.g. Chafe, 1976; Brennan et al., 1987; Crawley and Stevenson, 1990). With respect to the second scale, Dowty (1991) and Primus (1999, 2006) assume that individuals are ranked according to the number of agentivity features they have with respect to the eventuality[4] denoted by the respective verb (i.e. the verb whose arguments the noun phrases referring to those individuals are). As we have already seen in section 2.2, the relevant features defining agentivity are control (of the respective eventuality), volitionality/intentionality and sentience.

Crucially, Dowty (1991) and Primus (1999, 2006) show that there is a (crosslinguistically rather stable) mapping relation between the two scales, with the DP referring to the individual with the highest number of agentivity features being realized as the grammatical subject of the respective clause. Taking this insight into account, it might well be that in order to be licensed as perspectival centers, protagonists only need to be maximally prominent with respect to one of the two scales, with their prominence regarding the other scale just being an artifact of the mapping relation. In order to test whether this is the case and, if it is, which of the two scales is the right one, we can use the method employed by Schumacher et al. (2016) in their comparative study of personal and demonstrative pronouns in German and consider sentences containing members of a class of verbs that are exceptional in the following sense: The argument with the highest number of agentivity features is not realized as the grammatical subject, but as the (indirect or direct) object.[5] They are thus called *object experiencer verbs*. Consider the text fragments in (15) and (16): In the opening sentences George is more prominent than Mary in terms of grammatical function of the respective DP referring to him or her (subject vs. object), while he is less prominent in terms of agentivity features – Mary is sentient with respect to the eventuality denoted by the verb, while George is not (and also does not have any other relevant agentivity feature such as control or volition).

(15) George bore Mary to death.
    a. Tomorrow she would definitely avoid sitting at a table with the bloated idiot again.
    b. #How sleepy she looked today!

(16) George pleased Mary a lot.
    a. How handsome he looked in his new blue suit again today!
    b. #How admiringly she looked at him again today!

In judging the felicity of the sentences in (15a-b) and (16a-b) in their respective contexts it is important to set aside the option of interpreting them not as instances of FID, but rather as statements made from the speaker's/narrator's

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[4] The term *eventuality* applies to both dynamic events and states.
[5] Schumacher et al. (2016) restrict their attention to dative experiencer verbs, i.e. to verbs where the experiencer is realized as the indirect object (which bears dative case in German).

perspective, with the evaluative expressions expressing the speaker's/narrator's judgements and the temporal indexicals interpreted with respect to the speaker's/narrator's context. Setting aside this option, the sentences in (15a) and (16a) can only sensibly be ascribed to Mary. Crucially, they are entirely natural and coherent in the context of (15) and (16), respectively. The ones in (15b) and (16b), in contrast, which can only sensibly be ascribed to George, sound quite odd and incoherent in the same context. This provides evidence that what is crucial for the local licensing of protagonists as perspectival centers is prominence not in terms of the grammatical function of the DPs referring to them, but rather in terms of thematic role/agentivity features. More precisely, the agentivity feature that is present in all cases considered where a discourse referent is locally licensed as perspectival center and absent in all cases where it is not licensed is sentience. Let us thus assume that what is crucial for the local licensing of discourse referents as perspectival centers is sentience with respect to the eventuality introduced by the verb of the sentence preceding the one in FID-mode (in combination with the inferability of a coherence relation linking the two sentences). The pattern in (8), (12) and (14) would thus be an indirect consequence of the fact that sentience is one of the features defining agentivity, and that the participants of an eventuality with the highest number of agentivity features with respect to that eventuality tend to be realized as grammatical subjects. But why should sentience be decisive?

Note that in order to interpret a sentence as an instance of FID the reader or listener needs to accommodate the existence of a mental event whose temporal location coincides with that of the eventuality introduced by the immediately preceding sentence and whose experiencer is some protagonist mentioned in that sentence – namely an event of a protagonist thinking the thought whose content is provided by the sentence in FID mode (or which, on Maier's (2015) account, is even partially quoted). The reader or listener thus needs to identify one of the participants of the eventuality introduced by the verb of the immediately preceding sentence as the experiencer of the thinking event to be accommodated (I continue to ignore the possibility that one of the participants is available as a perspectival center in virtue of being globally prominent with respect to the entire sentence for the time being). I assume that the pragmatic strategy for finding the right protagonist is constrained in the following way: Experiencers are sentient by definition. There is thus a strong preference for choosing that one among the available protagonists as the experiencer of the event to be accommodated that is sentient with respect to the eventuality introduced by the verb of the immediately preceding sentence. The intuition behind this is that sentience with respect to the latter eventuality singles the respective protagonist out as a candidate for being the experiencer of the event to be accommodated because experiencers are defined in terms of sentience.

The pragmatic strategy and the reasoning behind it is compatible with both types of account of FID discussed in section 2.2 since the thinking event needs to be accommodated irrespective of whether its content is partially quoted or it involves the interpretation of its content with respect to an additional context. Let us now turn to the issue of what makes protagonists prominent enough to become perspectival centers even in the absence of local prominence in terms of sentience. Consider again the text segments in (11b) and (14a), repeated here as (17) and (18), respectively.

(17)   George entered the room and looked around cautiously. Susan was sitting at a table in the corner with her best friend. Susan looked at George hatefully. The mean old bat had managed to make him look like an idiot at the meeting yesterday.

(18)   Mary went towards the entrance of the building. Suddenly a huge guy in a black coat came around the corner. She bumped into him head-on. Angrily, he smacked her in the face with his bag. Ouch, how that hurt!

The final sentence in (17) can be interpreted as a thought of George and the one in (18) as a thought of Mary without any problems, although George is the theme and Mary the patient of the eventuality introduced by the verb of the respective immediately preceding sentence. Both are thus predicted by the pragmatic strategy just sketched to be at least strongly dispreferred as experiencers of the mental events to be accommodated, since in each case they are not sentient with respect to the eventuality introduced by the verb of the preceding sentence, while a protagonist who is sentient with respect to that eventuality is available: Susan in the case of (17) and the man introduced by the indefinite in (18). What makes these two protagonists globally prominent enough with respect to the respective text segment to be available as perspectival centers nonetheless?

Let us concentrate on (17) first. What seems to be crucial is the fact that George is mentioned in the opening sentence of the text segment. If we alter the order of the first two sentences, as in (19), it is much harder to interpret the final sentence as a thought of George, and since another plausible interpretation is not easily available (the only other option would be to interpret it as a thought of the narrator), the text segment in its entirety becomes rather incoherent.

(19)   Susan was sitting at a table in the corner with her best friend. George entered the room and looked around cautiously. Susan looked at George hatefully. #The mean old hag had managed to make him look like an idiot at the meeting yesterday.

Note that there is no difference between (17) and (19) concerning the order in which the eventualities *occur*: The interval during which the state of Susan sitting at a table holds in both cases includes the running time of the event of George entering the room. The difference only concerns the order in which they are *mentioned*. Intuitively, mentioning the event whose agent is George first seems to have the effect of turning the text segment into a story about George, while mentioning the state whose experiencer is Susan first seems to have the effect of turning it into a story about Susan. In other words, George is felt to be the discourse topic with respect to (17), while Susan is felt to be the discourse topic with respect to (19). Unfortunately, the notion of discourse topicality is even more difficult to define in precise terms than the notion of aboutness topicality (Hockett, 1958; Kuno, 1972; Reinhart, 1981; Gundel, 1988; Portner and Yabushita, 1998). Bosch and Umbach (2006), based on Prince (1992), assume those individuals to be discourse topics that after having been introduced into the discourse are taken up anaphorically several times. This idea is of no help, however, in understanding the difference between (17) and (19) since both George and Susan have been picked up repeatedly by the time at which the final sentence needs to be interpreted.

But there is another, quite different notion of discourse topicality that will turn out to be more useful with respect to our concerns. On this view, not only utterances in oral conversations answer explicit or implicit questions, but also sentences in all kinds of written texts. Those questions are hierarchically structured: For each conversation, text or text segment there is a superquestion, the discourse topic, which is addressed by the conversation, text or text segment in its entirety. This superquestion is broken down into subquestions, which can in turn be broken down into subquestions as well, until the level of individual sentences is reached. Subquestions are related to their respective superquestion in the following way: The complete answer to each subquestion provides a partial answer to the superquestion. Crucially, the conversation, text or text segment proceeds by answering the subquestions in turn, starting on the lowest level, i.e. the level at which the individual sentences answer one subquestion each, until the superquestion functioning as the discourse topic is finally answered completely (Roberts, 1996; see Klein and von Stutterheim, 1987; van Kuppevelt, 1995 for similar views).

Since in written texts both the superquestion and its subquestions are usually left implicit, the reader's task in interpreting a text is to identify those questions. The focus-background structure of the individual sentences gives the important clues here, where the explicitly given or inferable parts correspond to the background and the new parts to the focus: The focal part of the respective sentence replaces the wh-term contained in the implicit subquestion the sentence answers, thus picking one from the set of possible answers. The given or inferable material contained in the respective sentence, the background, in contrast, corresponds to the remaining part of that subquestion. Depending on whether only John, or John and the time interval (referred to by the adverbial) *yesterday evening* or the fact that John went to the movies has been mentioned before, a sentence such as *John went to the movies yesterday evening* can then, for instance, be understood as answering the questions *What did John do?*, *What did John do yesterday evening?* and *When did John go to the movies?*, respectively. As pointed out by Roberts (2012; see also van Dijk, 1977 for related discussion), there is a relation between discourse topics and aboutness topics insofar as the aboutness topic of a sentence is always contained in the non-wh-part of the local subquestion that the sentence answers. Taking this idea one step further, the discourse topic in the first sense of the term employed above, where it applies to the individual about which the respective text or text segment is felt to tell a story (henceforth: the i-discourse topic), is always contained in the non-wh-part of the superquestion that the text or text segment in its entirety answers, i.e. the discourse topic in the second sense of the term (henceforth: the q-discourse topic).

Now, the superquestion answered by a text or text segment can of course only be inferred in a very indirect way, via its subquestions, which can in turn be inferred on the basis of the focus-background structure of individual sentences. In narrative texts or text segments there is a strong initial expectation that they have a central protagonist (the i-discourse topic) and that the superquestion addressed by the text or text segment (the q-discourse topic) is a question about that protagonist – a question about what that protagonist did or what happened to him or her on some specific occasion or during some specific time interval. Consequently, the subquestions to that superquestion, which are answered by the individual sentences in the text, are then in their majority questions about that protagonist as well – questions that ask for what he or she did at some point, what happened to him or her or what he or she thought or perceived. Given this state of affairs, the subquestion answered by the opening sentence of a narrative text segment is very likely to be of that kind as well. In addition to that, in both (17) and (19) only one protagonist is mentioned in the opening sentence and that protagonist is not introduced by an indefinite noun phrase, but rather referred to by a proper name and thus treated as if he or she were already familiar to the reader (which is of course not really the case) and thus part of the background. There is thus a strong tendency to assume that protagonist to be the central one, i.e. the i-discourse topic, which is consequently contained in the non-wh-part of the superquestion corresponding to the q-discourse topic.

In (17) the superquestion that the text segment is taken to address is thus presumably a question like *What happened to George (on some specific occasion)?*, with George consequently being the i-discourse topic. The opening sentence can then be taken to answer a question such as *What did George do first?* Concerning the eventualities introduced by the following two sentences, George is not involved in them. They can, however, easily be understood as describing

eventualities that John is seeing upon entering the room and looking around cautiously, and consequently as answering a question like *What did he see there*? Due to the inferred super- and the corresponding subquestions, George is thus established as a ''global experiencer'' with respect to the entire text segment. Consequently, it is natural to interpret the final sentence in FID mode as an answer to a question such as *What did he think?*, which in turn establishes George as the experiencer of the thinking event to be accommodated. In (19), in contrast, the same reasoning as the one applied to (17) leads to the expectation that Susan is the i-discourse topic, and the text segment in its entirety addresses a question such as *What happened to Susan (on some specific occasion)?* Consequently, with Susan being the ''global experiencer'', it would be natural to interpret the final sentence as an answer to a question such as *What did Susan think?*, but not a question such as *What did George think?*. At the same time, George is not locally prominent in terms of sentience, since he is the theme of the sentence immediately preceding the one in FID mode. It is thus very hard to interpret the latter sentence as a thought of George, although this would be plausible in terms of content, while interpreting it as a thought of Susan makes no sense.

Note that the notion of a ''global experiencer'' that is identified via the (implicit) superquestion that a text or text segment in its entirety is taken to address is intuitively related to the narratological/literary notion of a story's protagonist in the sense of being the main character who experiences something which changes the course of his/her life, undergoes some kind of character development etc. Since a detailed investigation of that connection would take my beyond the scope of the present paper, however, I will leave it as a topic for future research.

Basically the same reasoning as the one just sketched for (17) applies to (18): Being referred to by a proper name in the opening sentence makes Mary the most likely candidate for being the i-discourse topic. Consequently, the superquestion corresponding to the q-discourse topic is presumably a question such as *What happened to Mary (on some specific occasion)?*, with the subquestions answered by the individual sentences all being questions about Mary as well. Mary is thus established as a ''global experiencer'' with respect to the entire text segment. This effect is further strengthened by the presence of the two perspective dependent expressions *suddenly* and *came* in the second sentence, which can easily be linked to Mary – it is very natural to assume that Mary is surprised by the event that is introduced by that sentence, and that that event is a movement of the man introduced by the indefinite in Mary's direction. The final sentence in FID mode can thus easily be interpreted as answering a question such as *What did Mary think?*, which in turn establishes Mary as the experiencer of the thinking event to be accommodated. Concerning the text segment in (12a), in contrast, repeated here as (20), the same reasoning as in (19) applies – in terms of content, the final sentence in FID mode can only be ascribed to a protagonist that has not been established as a global experiencer and is at the same time not locally prominent in terms of sentience, since he is the patient, not the agent of the event introduced by the sentence immediately preceding the final one.

(20)   Mary went towards the entrance of the building. Suddenly a huge guy in a black coat came around the corner. He bumped into her head-on. Angrily, she smacked him in the face with her bag. #Ouch, how that hurt!

In fact, the man in (20) is an even less likely candidate for being the i-discourse topic than George is in (19): Being introduced by an indefinite in the second sentence, he is explicitly marked as novel (Kamp, 1981; Heim, 1982) and can thus by definition not be contained in the non-wh-part of the superquestion that the text segment in its entirety addresses.

In this section, I have discussed two different strategies for identifying a discourse referent as the perspectival center to whom a sentence in FID-mode can be ascribed as thought (or utterance). First, a strategy based on local prominence in terms of sentience according to which discourse referents become available as perspectival centers for the following reason: Given that sentience is the defining feature for experiencerhood, a discourse referent's sentience with respect to the eventuality introduced by the verb of the immediately preceding sentence singles him or her out as a candidate for being the experiencer of the thinking event to be accommodated. Consequently, s/he is identified as the experiencer of that event if its is plausible that s/he has a thought the content of which is the content of the sentence in FID-mode at a time overlapping with or immediately following the run time of the eventuality introduced by the verb of the preceding sentence. The second strategy is based on global prominence: Discourse referents that are i-topics of the respective text segment in the sense that the entire text segment is understood as answering a question about them become available as experiencers of the speech act to be accommodated in virtue of being ''global experiencers'' with respect to that text segment. This holds even if the respective discourse referent is not sentient with respect to the eventuality introduced by the verb of the immediately preceding sentence. Consequently, s/he is identified as the experiencer of the thinking event to be accommodated if it is plausible in terms of content that s/he has the respective thought at the relevant time. Discourse referents that are neither locally nor globally prominent in the sense just defined are not available as perspectival centers, even if it was plausible in terms of content to ascribe the sentence in FID-mode as a thought to them.

In the cases that we have considered so far where both a locally and a globally prominent discourse referent is in principle available as perspectival center the content of the sentence in FID-mode always decided which one of the two was actually chosen: In (11a-b), repeated here as (21a-b), George is in principle available as perspectival center in terms of global and Susan in terms of local prominence at the point where the respective sentence in FID-mode is to be interpreted. The final sentence in (11a)/(21a) can only be made sense of if it is a thought of Susan, however, and the final sentence in (11b) if it is a thought of George, however. The same reasoning applies to (14a-b), repeated here as (22a-b).

(21) a. George entered the room and looked around cautiously. Susan was sitting at a table in the corner with her best friend. Susan looked at George hatefully. The dumb jerk had managed to make her look like an idiot at the meeting yesterday.
b. George entered the room and looked around cautiously. Susan was sitting at a table in the corner with her best friend. Susan looked at George hatefully. The mean old hag had managed to make him look like an idiot at the meeting yesterday.

(22) Mary went towards the entrance of the building. Suddenly a huge guy in a black coat came around the corner. She bumped into him head-on. Angrily, he smacked her in the face with his bag.
a. Ouch, how that hurt!
b. That would teach the old hag to watch out!

The analysis argued for in this section now makes a clear prediction: In a text segment such as (11a-b)/(21a-b) and (14a-b)/(22a-b), where both a locally and a globally prominent discourse referent is in principle available as perspectival center, a sentence in FID-mode that can be understood as a thought of either one should lead to ambiguity. This prediction is borne out: In the context of the same four opening sentences as in (14a-b)/(22a-b), the (identical) first sentence in (23a) and (23b) can either be understood as a thought of Mary or a thought of the man, and the ambiguity is resolved by the respective continuation.

(23) Mary went towards the entrance of the building. Suddenly a huge guy in a black coat came around the corner. She bumped into him head-on. Angrily, he smacked her in the face with his bag.
a. Why did everything go wrong today? First, she had woken up with a terrible headache, then she had lost her keys, and now this!
b. Why did everything go wrong today? He had been so successful with his anger management training, and now this!

3. Conclusion

In this paper I have given some preliminary answers to a question that has not received much attention in the linguistic literature dealing with FID – namely the question of what the conditions are under which protagonists become available as perspectival centers, i.e. as anchors for sentences or stretches of discourse in FID mode. On the basis of preliminary data consisting of short text segments with two protagonists I have argued that in order to be licit perspectival centers, protagonists either need to be locally prominent in the sense of being sentient with respect to the eventuality introduced by the verb of the sentence immediately preceding the one in FID mode, or globally prominent with respect to the entire text segment in the sense of being i-discourse topics. I have characterized in rather general, theory neutral terms a pragmatic strategy that accounts for this pattern, based on the following idea: In order to interpret a given sentence as an instance of FID, an event of some protagonist thinking a thought whose content is provided by the respective sentence needs to be accommodated. Consequently, one of the available protagonists needs to be identified as the experiencer of that thinking event. Since experiencerhood is defined in terms of sentience, protagonists whose sentience is locally salient or which function as "global experiencers" with respect to the entire text segment are strongly preferred. If the respective sentence in FID mode can not plausibly be interpreted as a thought of a protagonist that is locally or globally prominent in this sense, it is much more difficult to arrive at a coherent interpretation for the respective text segment – which is only possible via interpreting the sentence as a thought of some other protagonist.

In order to reach more definitive conclusions concerning the conditions under which protagonists become available as perspectival centers, serious empirical research employing methods such as reading time measurements and acceptability ratings is required. The next step then consists in integrating a more precise and further developed version of the pragmatic strategy informally described in section 2.3 into a formal discourse model. If the research reported in this paper provides a useful starting point fur such investigations, it has achieved its goal.

Acknowledgements

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